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Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update

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Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update

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Identifies the remote update to a computer account’s DnsHostName attribute. If the new value set is a valid domain controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller, then it’s highly likely a preparation step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin privileges.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-system.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Privilege Escalation
Active Directory

Version: 101 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.3.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where
event.action == "logged-in" and winlog.logon.type == "Network" and
event.outcome == "success" and not user.name == "ANONYMOUS LOGON"
and not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : "*$" and not
user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and
source.ip !="::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [iam where
event.action == "changed-computer-account" and /* if DnsHostName
value equal a DC DNS hostname then it's highly suspicious */
winlog.event_data.DnsHostName : "??*" and /* exclude FPs
where DnsHostName starts with the ComputerName that was changed */
not startswith~(winlog.event_data.DnsHostName,
substring(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName, 0,
length(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName) - 1)) ] by
winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- ID: T1068
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/

Rule version history

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Version 101 (8.6.0 release)

Updated query, changed from:

sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where
event.action == "logged-in" and winlog.logon.type == "Network" and
event.outcome == "success" and not user.name == "ANONYMOUS LOGON"
and not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : "*$" and not
user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and
source.ip !="::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId [iam where
event.action == "changed-computer-account" and /* if DnsHostName
value equal a DC DNS hostname then it's highly suspicious */
winlog.event_data.DnsHostName : "??*"] by
winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId

Version 100 (8.5.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 2 (8.4.0 release)

Formatting only

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