IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.
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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.4] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Privilege Escalation

Version: 4 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.0.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings:
`condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"`

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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file where event.action : "Pipe Created*" and /* normal sysmon named
pipe creation events truncate the pipe keyword */ file.name :
"\\*\\Pipe\\*"

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 4 (8.4.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (8.2.0 release)
  • Formatting only
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