AdminSDHolder Backdoor
editAdminSDHolder Backdoor
editDetects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain’s AdminSDHolder object, regaining their Administrative Privileges.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-system.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
- Active Directory
Version: 3 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.1.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
editevent.action:"Directory Service Changes" and event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Rule version history
edit- Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only