IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.
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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.3] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy

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Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy

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Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusing the auto addition of the Secure Shell Daemon (sshd) to the authorized application list for Full Disk Access. This may indicate attempts to bypass macOS privacy controls to access sensitive files.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • auditbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • macOS
  • Threat Detection
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Defense Evasion

Version: 3 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.3.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name:"scp" and process.args:"StrictHostKeyChecking=no" and
process.command_line:("scp *localhost:/*", "scp *127.0.0.1:/*") and
not process.args:"vagrant@*127.0.0.1*"

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 3 (8.3.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (8.2.0 release)
  • Formatting only
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