IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.
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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.3] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

O365 Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass

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O365 Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass

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Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit is responsible for logging specified mailbox events (like accessing a folder or a message or permanently deleting a message). However, actions taken by some authorized accounts, such as accounts used by third-party tools or accounts used for lawful monitoring, can create a large number of mailbox audit log entries and may not be of interest to your organization. Because of this, administrators can create bypass associations, allowing certain accounts to perform their tasks without being logged. Attackers can abuse this allowlist mechanism to conceal actions taken, as the mailbox audit will log no activity done by the account.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

  • filebeat-*
  • logs-o365*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-30m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Cloud
  • Microsoft 365
  • Continuous Monitoring
  • SecOps
  • Initial Access

Version: 3 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.0.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.1.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Potential false positives

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Legitimate allowlisting of noisy accounts

Investigation guide

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## Config

The Office 365 Logs Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.

Rule query

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event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:Exchange and
event.action:Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation and
event.outcome:success

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 3 (8.1.0 release)
  • Formatting only
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