Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable

Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Execution

Version: 4 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.10.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
process.pe.original_file_name : "psexesvc.exe" and not process.name :
"PSEXESVC.exe"

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: System Services
- ID: T1569
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/

Rule version history

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Version 4 (7.12.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 3 (7.11.2 release)

Formatting only

Version 2 (7.11.0 release)

Updated query, changed from:

event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and
(process.pe.original_file_name:(psexesvc.exe or PSEXESVC.exe) or
winlog.event_data.OriginalFileName:(psexesvc.exe or PSEXESVC.exe)) and
process.parent.name:services.exe and not process.name:(psexesvc.exe or
PSEXESVC.exe)

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