Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter

Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt script tends to rename the AutoIt executable to avoid detection.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Defense Evasion

Version: 5 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.10.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
process.pe.original_file_name : "AutoIt*.exe" and not process.name :
"AutoIt*.exe"

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Masquerading
- ID: T1036
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/

Rule version history

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Version 5 (7.16.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 4 (7.12.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 3 (7.11.2 release)

Formatting only

Version 2 (7.11.0 release)

Updated query, changed from:

event.category:process AND event.type:(start OR process_started) AND (
process.pe.original_file_name:/[aA][uU][tT][oO][iI][tT]\d\.[eE][xX][eE
]/ OR winlog.event_data.OriginalFileName:/[aA][uU][tT][oO][iI][tT]\d\.
[eE][xX][eE]/) AND NOT
process.name:/[aA][uU][tT][oO][iI][tT]\d{1,3}\.[eE][xX][eE]/

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