Potential DNS Tunneling via NsLookup

This rule identifies a large number (15) of nslookup.exe executions with an explicit query type from the same host. This may indicate command and control activity utilizing the DNS protocol.

Rule type: threshold

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-in-the-wild-overview-of-oilrigs-dns-tunneling/

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Command and Control

Version: 3 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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event.category:process and event.type:start and
process.name:nslookup.exe and process.args:(-querytype=* or -qt=* or
-q=* or -type=*)

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Command and Control
- ID: TA0011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
Technique:
- Name: Application Layer Protocol
- ID: T1071
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/

Rule version history

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Version 3 (7.16.0 release)

Formatting only

Version 2 (7.12.0 release)

Formatting only

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