Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools

Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/logman

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Defense Evasion

Version: 2 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.14.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0

Rule authors: Elastic, Ivan Ninichuck, Austin Songer

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
((process.name:"logman.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name ==
"Logman.exe") and process.args : "EventLog-*" and process.args :
("stop", "delete")) or ((process.name : ("pwsh.exe",
"powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or
process.pe.original_file_name in ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe",
"powershell_ise.exe")) and process.args : "Set-Service" and
process.args: "EventLog" and process.args : "Disabled") or
((process.name:"auditpol.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name ==
"AUDITPOL.EXE") and process.args : "/success:disable")

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Indicator Removal on Host
- ID: T1070
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/

Rule version history

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Version 2 (7.16.0 release)

Formatting only

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