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Network Connection via Certutil
editNetwork Connection via Certutil
editIdentifies certutil.exe
making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe
to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Command and Control
Version: 7
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Network Connection via Certutil Attackers can abuse `certutil.exe` to download malware, offensive security tools, and certificates from external sources in order to take the next steps in a compromised environment. This rule looks for network events where `certutil.exe` contacts IP ranges other than the ones specified in [IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry](https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml) #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree). - Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours. - Investigate if the downloaded file was executed. - Determine the context in which `certutil.exe` and the file were run. - Retrieve the file downloaded and: - Use a sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis. - Observe attempts of contacting external domains and addresses. - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the SHA-256 hash value of the file. - Search for the existence of this file in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. ### False positive analysis - This mechanism can be used legitimately. If trusted software uses this command and the triage has not identified anything suspicious, this alert can be closed as a false positive. - If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions. ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. - Implement any temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation required to contain the malware.
Rule query
editsequence by process.entity_id [process where process.name : "certutil.exe" and event.type == "start"] [network where process.name : "certutil.exe" and not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Command and Control
- ID: TA0011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
-
Technique:
- Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
- ID: T1105
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/